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‘Polio could strike your child’. ‘Polio could strike you’. ‘Polio can strike anyone – even 
the fittest’; so declared three newspaper advertisements from the Ministry of Health’s 
1959 campaign to increase rates of polio vaccination in Britain.1 Provided to areas 
where vaccine uptake was low, these advertisements represent snapshots of an evolving 
vaccination campaign which adapted to persuade an ever broader and more fractured 
public to seek vaccination. Since the first British epidemic in 1947, polio, a viral 
disease, had affected thousands of children, sometimes causing muscle weakness, 
paralysis or even death. Eye-catching and emotive, newspaper advertisements and 
posters were just one expression of the government’s polio strategy; disseminating 
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carefully constructed narratives about citizenship, motherhood, youth and health.2 
While the campaign’s engagement with these ideas was familiar from other efforts to 
improve public health,3 it also relied on, and battled against, the specific narratives 
which existed around, and were created by, polio.4  
This article explores the government’s polio vaccination campaign through its 
newspaper advertisements and posters, investigating their cultural, political and 
emotional context. It argues that as the press reported on problems which inhibited the 
vaccine campaign, and the various publics who could register for the polio vaccination 
multiplied, the posters changed, evolving to target the assumed emotional and 
educational needs of each newly eligible public through text and image. The British 
inactivated poliomyelitis vaccine (IPV) programme began in 1956 and effectively ended 
in 1962 with the introduction of a new oral vaccine. Initially, IPV – a vaccine using 
inactivated strains of poliovirus and injected into the patient – was offered only to 
children. However, the Ministry of Health gradually expanded the eligibility criteria to 
include young adults and then everyone under the age of 40; an incremental widening of 
targeted ‘publics’ across the late 1950s and early 1960s. This meant that unlike previous 
vaccine campaigns which focused on infants, the campaign had to evolve to reach 
different groups, requiring those producing promotion materials to imagine these 
publics (and their emotions) in different ways.5  This can be seen in the way early poster 
and newspaper adverts explained IPV’s benefits to the mothers of infants, whereas later 
propaganda emphasized the financial risks to the family if a father were struck by the 
disease:6 the emotionally inflected images and text of the posters were adapted as key 
target audiences changed. Focusing on the emotional dimensions of the polio 
vaccination campaign facilitates our exploration of the nature of the relationship 
between public health policy makers and the public.  The perceived need to manage and 
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manipulate the emotions which various ‘publics’ were assumed to possess exposes their 
constructed nature, but also complicates simplistic understandings of rationality in 
policy making and practice.   
This article discusses the production and dissemination of messages promoting 
polio vaccination, tracing ideas about both the public and the vaccine back and forth 
through the archive and into the public sphere via posters and the news print media. 
This article does not set out to explore the extent to which these materials worked in 
terms of increasing vaccine uptake. The effectiveness of the publicity is difficult to 
unpick from the impact of the widely reported supply crises and political problems 
which dogged the vaccine campaign.7  Moreover, these have been detailed elsewhere.8 
Instead, this article performs a close textual analysis of a variety of government issued 
newspaper advertisements, posters and contemporary newspaper reports to understand 
the campaign’s emotional context and content. While not exhaustive of all the 
vaccination educational material produced by the government over the period, they 
formed the backbone of national (UK-wide) advertisements which were supplemented 
by local efforts.   
We begin with an explanation of our analytic, situating the posters and 
advertisements as objects methodologically and historically. By making use of a 
combination of techniques drawn from Bakhtinian literary analysis and the history of 
emotions, we access some of the emotions behind the textual record of the IPV 
campaign.  This illuminates the government’s evolving assumptions about the various 
publics they were attempting to cajole into registering for the IPV.  This approach 
reveals that the public were a fractured entity, envisioned by the state as groups of 
rational and irrational emotional communities.  As the vaccination programme 
expanded to include older publics, ideas about IPV, the public and citizenship were 
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overlaid and combined, rather than replaced, allowing a layering of ideas which reached 
multiple groups through singular texts.  Simultaneously, we argue that while it is not 
our purpose to recover the lived experience of those publics interacting with this 
campaign, their experiences were, albeit in a limited way, constitutive to the campaign’s 
trajectory and outcomes.  The public were not an inert entity acted on only from above, 
rather they were a fractured, reactive, and unpredictable force which often forced policy 
makers to respond to their demands for reassurance, information, and vaccines.9  
Conceptualising Publics, Texts, and Emotions 
The creation of a ‘text’10 for the consumption of the public is an innately political act 
which transmits both normative and unforeseen ideas about what the public is, should, 
and could be. This perspective, borrowing from Lacan, usefully locates the ends, and 
audiences, constructed through didactic textual elements; those images and words 
intended to educate, persuade or dissuade, and which thereby reveal and create the 
producer’s flawed and ideal imagined audiences.11 Additionally, Bakhtin reminds us 
texts are artefacts produced not just by their creators, but also by their situated 
audiences, received within, and changed by, a cultural context in flux. Intertextuality 
acknowledges this instability and the ‘work-like’ aspects of texts: those dialogical 
elements which supplement ‘empirical reality by adding to, and subtracting from’ it – 
the underlying imagination, motives, and emotions of audience and producer evident in 
the ideologies and narratives captured by the text and its reception.12 
Applying this intertextual methodology to public health advertisements and 
posters is revealing.  Posters operate as a particular kind of text. Timmers suggests 
posters are the ‘product of communication between an active force and a reactive one’; 
the originator has a ‘message to sell’ which the recipient must be persuaded to ‘buy’.13  
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Indeed, when the poster emerged in the late nineteenth century its primary subject was 
advertisements for products available in the growing consumer economy.14 Posters were 
soon deployed for other uses though, and while those delivering public health messages 
were rare before the First World War, after this period they were increasingly used to 
communicate messages around issues such as tuberculosis, venereal disease, and 
alcoholism.15  Far from neutral texts, Cooter and Stein assert that the public health 
poster ‘moralizes behavior, guiding the viewer to a clear notion of what is or is not 
socially acceptable.’16 Posters did not simply speak for themselves.17  As Gilman 
reminds us, the vocabulary of posters was complex and contradictory, open to multiple 
readings that changed over time and place.18    
While it is difficult to access the experiences of the publics which interacted 
with posters and advertisements, as Myers points out, pedagogic texts are the product of 
a ‘two-way traffic between producer and consumer’ and the context in which these are 
propagated.19  Conceiving of texts in this way also provides the tools to excavate the 
underlying emotions and emotional communities,20 both lived and imagined which 
fostered, produced, and were reproduced by the text.21 Here we draw on Rosenwein’s 
concept of the ‘emotional community’ to guide our analysis.  Emotional communities 
are ‘the same as social communities’, but as Rosenwein argues, the researcher’s 
emphasis is upon the ‘systems of feeling’ which govern them – what these 
‘communities (and the individuals within them) define and assess as valuable or 
harmful to them; the evaluations […] about other’s emotions; the nature of the affective 
bonds between people that they recognize; and the modes of emotional expression that 
they expect, encourage, tolerate, and deplore.’22 An intertextual approach, with its 
emphasis on the lived experience of both audiences and producers, combined with the 
attention to emotion Rosenwein encourages, reveals the emotional dialogues expressed 
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within a text, gesturing to the emotional communities (lived and imagined) which form 
the context for the text’s creation and reception, while emphasising the normative power 
behind these elements. By understanding the productive work of the makers of polio 
vaccination posters as taking place within an emotional community we are able to 
contextualise the posters’ emotional elements and the work they do as texts. In turn, this 
close reading can illuminate the authors’ vision of the public as a variety of emotional 
communities.  
These approaches are especially germane to the study of the polio vaccination 
campaigns because of the volume of comment on the emotions, predominantly fear and 
anxiety, that surrounded the disease. Indeed, Williams titled his poliomyelitis biography 
Paralysed with Fear.23  Yet, despite pervasive acknowledgement of the power of these 
emotions and their ubiquitous presence within discussions of polio, the British 
historiography lacks a thorough dealing with its emotional history.24 This article begins 
the work needed to redress this lacuna by exploring which emotions various publics 
were assumed to be feeling about IPV and which emotions were deployed to persuade 
them to seek vaccination.  
Assumptions about the emotional nature of the public have long played a role in 
public health policy and practice.  As Cantor points out, pre-war medical elites 
imagined the public as emotionally disturbed, unable to control their behaviour and in 
danger of being led astray by their emotions.25  Until the 1950s, according to Toon, 
large parts of the ‘cancer establishment’ believed that the public were so afraid of 
cancer that efforts to educate them about the disease were counterproductive.26  Despite 
these reservations, health education was part of public health practice since at least the 
nineteenth century, based on the idea that the public could be instructed in rational 
behaviour.  While health education in the inter-war period focused on topics such as 
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personal hygiene, motherhood and the promotion of good citizenship, by the middle of 
the twentieth century, as infectious disease gave way to chronic disease, campaigns 
increasingly targeted individual behaviour in order to prevent ill-health.27  Vaccination, 
although still focused on infectious disease rather than new threats to public health like 
smoking and diet, fitted this preventive ethos.  
Efforts to promote vaccination also encapsulated the tension-filled dichotomy 
between rationality and irrationality often present in health education.  The public were 
imagined as both obstacle and solution to polio –  as both rational and emotional – able 
to act in a way that could prevent polio by registering for the vaccination, or to spread 
the disease if they failed to vaccinate.  This resulted in the construction of different 
‘publics’.  The public were simultaneously: individuals or groups vulnerable to disease; 
threats to the stability of the state as potential vectors for the spread of disease; and the 
mechanism by which, if persuaded to vaccinate, disease might be prevented.  
Addressing these three publics – potential victim, vector and vaccinator – the 
government presented the problem of polio as soluble through the actions of obedient 
citizens. In seeking vaccination, they availed themselves of a new medical technology, 
guarded the nation against calamity and ensured the possibility of a polio-free future. 
This narrative of futurity, inherent in preventative medicine, was bolstered throughout 
the polio vaccine campaign by an emphasis on the availability and newness of the polio 
vaccine. This was coupled with highlighting vaccination as a duty of citizenship.  For 
parents, this meant protecting children as future citizens.28 For young people who could 
self-register, vaccination operated as a task marking entry into a future as citizens. In 
the case of older married men, vaccination offered an ensured continuation of their 
status as breadwinners through the prevention of the potentially incapacitating effects of 
polio.  Thus vaccination was associated with modern citizenship, an essential part of a 
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desirable lifestyle for young adults and parents alike.  Health officials emphasised the 
benefits of vaccination to the individual, but the undertones were clear. Parents were 
morally obliged to protect themselves and their children from now-preventable diseases 
to reduce the risk of disability and expensive medical care in the future. At the same 
time, vaccination was presented as a ‘gift’ of modern, technocratic medicine and the 
social rights of the nascent welfare state – albeit a gift that one ought not to refuse.29 
  
Polio, the polio vaccine and emotion  
Polio was a ‘virgin soil’ infection of the modern period and the first epidemic did not hit 
Britain until 1947.30  Anxieties were exacerbated by medical science’s inability to offer 
much defence against the disease.31 Indeed, contrary to contemporary public health 
science, good sanitation and hygiene appeared to make a country more susceptible, with 
wealthy suburbs and inner-city slums affected in equal measure.32  Although most 
infected people do not present with any symptoms, in severe cases polio can cause limb 
weakness, paralysis or death.33 Therapies were developed to ameliorate acute symptoms 
(such as the iron lung to combat paralysis of the diaphragm) and long-term 
rehabilitation (such as callipers and crutches to combat chronic muscle weakness), but 
no cure was ever found.34 The only long-term solution, therefore, was prophylaxis in the 
form of a vaccine.  
The story of polio in Britain was not limited by its national borders – press 
coverage followed the disease (and attempts combat it) internationally, focusing 
particularly on the effects of polio, vaccine research, and fund-raising efforts in 
America, such as the March of Dimes.35  In 1955, in front of the world’s media, 
researchers at the University of Michigan announced that they had successfully 
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produced a vaccine based on a formula developed by Jonas Salk, and within hours the 
United States’ government licenced its use.  The British government, traditionally 
cautious about introducing new vaccines, began trials through its Medical Research 
Council (MRC), encouraging the Daily Mail’s enthusiastic 1955 front-page declaration: 
‘Now Polio Vaccine For All – Britain to Buy it for the Health Service’.36  This 
optimism belied the complex web of emotions which circulated around the idea of a 
polio vaccine. While fear of polio was pervasive in the 1950s, there were also reasons to 
fear the vaccine.  Soon after IPV became widely available in the United States, Cutter 
Laboratories released a batch of vaccine containing poliovirus which had not been 
properly inactivated. The incident, which was widely reported by the British press, 
infected hundreds and led to the deaths of ten people, shaking the confidence of 
governments and publics in vaccine manufacturers, doctors and the arms of government 
responsible for vaccine rollout.37 As the Daily Express surmised in 1955, ‘the 
[American] government stands accused of negligence, manufactures of profiteering, and 
doctors of running a black market’, while ‘Health Minister Ian Macleod assured M.P.s 
that all Salk vaccine […] would be most rigorously tested’ and ‘there will be no delay 
going ahead.’38 Fallout from the Cutter incident affected potential IPV programmes 
globally.39  In Britain, the government decided not to abandon IPV, but to insist that a 
new British formula be used which would be less prone to manufacturing mistakes, 
more potent, and safer.40 
Despite the Cutter Incident, there was great appetite for the vaccine in the UK.41   
Vaccination had become increasingly important in British public health policy since the 
1940s.  The new health service had begun to provide (or was in the process of testing 
and licensing) vaccines against diphtheria, whooping cough and tuberculosis.42  When 
Minister of Health Robin Turton finally announced the introduction of the British IPV 
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programme in 1956, the Ministry organized a large press conference to convey the 
news.43  However, the Cutter incident had forced the Ministry to abandon American 
IPV and shift to a British formula months before the programme was planned to start, 
meaning that only two companies had licences to manufacture this new type of IPV, and 
only one had the capacity to deliver the vaccine at the start of the programme.44   
Controversy and Cohorts 
The intention behind the programme was that all children under the age of 10 and 
certain NHS staff would receive the vaccine – initially in two doses, later three.45  To 
distribute scarce supplies evenly, parents registered their children with the local Medical 
Officer of Health (MOH) who would then contact the family when IPV became 
available. The MRC also hoped to test the effectiveness of the vaccine by using the 
registration scheme to manage a cohort study.46  This meant that parents could not 
simply present their child at the clinic and have the procedure done as with other 
immunisations.  Even if they did register, the MRC’s selection method meant that there 
was a good chance their child would not be part of the first wave of those to be 
vaccinated.   
Given this complication, it is perhaps unsurprising that registration rates were 
lower than expected. Moreover, the freedom afforded to MOsH produced variable 
results.  By summer 1957, these ranged from 87 per cent of the target population 
vaccinated in the best-performing district to 20 per cent in the worst (with a national 
average of 29).  Even as supplies became available and the programme was extended to 
all children under the age of 15 in September 1957, registration was still low.  By 
autumn 1958, it was clear that registration rates were well below the desired coverage in 
many counties.  A nationally co-ordinated publicity campaign would, it was hoped, 
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improve the situation. However, while Ministry officials agreed that ‘stimulus’ in the 
form of publicity was necessary they also noted that a ‘national publicity campaign 
would probably be a waste of effort and money’, rather it was felt more tailored 
campaigns in poorly-performing areas would be more effective.47 Advertisements were 
placed in the local newspapers of poorly performing districts, while posters were 
distributed to waiting rooms and other interested parties as they had been during the 
diphtheria propaganda campaign.48 
For parents of young children – particularly mothers – vaccination was already a 
known entity, and government efforts to increase uptake were nothing new.49  A 
national smallpox vaccination programme existed from 1840, and the subsequent 
success of the war-time diphtheria immunisation campaign had demonstrated the 
benefits and power of modern vaccine technology.50  National and local authorities were 
similarly experienced in making contact with parents – usually mothers – through 
advertising and face-to-face contact via health visitors and interactions at clinics.51  
Debates about falling diphtheria immunisation and subsequent advertising earlier in the 
decade had established the importance of vaccination and the role citizens ought to play 
in the maintenance of their family’s health – and had also targeted mothers of young 
children. Moreover, even before the dedicated winter vaccination promotion campaign 
of 1958/59, the British public already knew about IPV.  There had been consistent press 
coverage of the disease, the development of this new technology and issues with supply 
throughout the 1950s.52  Locally, MOsH and their staff worked with regional 
newspapers, community groups and parents to let them know about the vaccine and the 
procedure for obtaining it.53 Thus, when the vaccination registration drive began, the 
government did not need to create awareness of the vaccine or instil ‘good citizenship’ 
in the population from scratch. 
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This context meant that the vaccine and the accompanying education campaign 
did not enter the target publics’ consciousness unencumbered; nor was the need for 
vaccination, as comprehended within the Ministry of Health and target health 
authorities, simply communicated to newly identified target groups in the form of raw 
epidemiological data.  Within the Ministry, the various incarnations of imagined target 
publics, constructed from epidemiological data then rendered numerically, 
geographically and according to date-of-birth, were further subdivided into the 
registered, unregistered and those requiring a third vaccination. These subdivisions 
identified groups in need of registration and vaccination with exactitude, but were too 
complex to communicate directly to the public. In fact, publicity materials which 
explicitly targeted those born after a certain date were abandoned for more simplistic 
age ranges when it was realised that ‘people did not connect a date of this kind to their 
own age’.54  This moved Ministry campaigns in line with newspapers which reported 
the vaccine’s availability to new cohorts using age ranges rather than dates of birth.55  
When advertising efforts included images, much of the imagery and text was designed 
to do dual service; targeting the under-10s alongside older cohorts in subscript. Posters 
often captured attention using the salient image of a vulnerable infant, while written 
encouragements told parents to also seek vaccination for older children.  
The vaccination programme and publicity campaign’s traditional focus on young 
children needed to be balanced with efforts to reach new target publics as the age range 
of those to be vaccinated expanded.  Although there were further supply issues over the 
course of 1958, by the autumn the Ministry felt it was able to extend the programme.  
From September, young adults up to the age of 26 were offered the vaccine.56  Initially, 
the Ministry struggled to get young adults interested.  They were, however, 
epidemiologically important.  While children were far more likely to contract polio and 
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to become paralyzed, adults with polio were more likely to die from the disease.57  For 
adults without young children, the Ministry planned a new publicity campaign to 
improve uptake.  The remainder of this article discusses these developments, excavating 
the different ways target cohorts were imagined by the campaigns’ producers, and for 
those members of the public who were assumed to have agency, persuaded. 
Phase 1. ‘they may have cause to reproach themselves’: the 1958/59 winter 
polio publicity campaign 
The 1958/1959 publicity campaign was a response to the uneven national uptake of the 
polio vaccine; the perception that a ‘good year’ for polio might lead to low press 
coverage of polio and consequently parental complacency regarding the need to register 
their children for vaccination; and also a response to direct requests from local health 
authorities struggling to raise registration rates.58  Production of newspaper adverts and 
posters evolved quickly, moving from text-heavy designs to more striking graphical 
depictions of children being struck by lightning bolts.  A Ministry of Health civil 
servant explained the intent behind the written and visual elements of the first iteration 
of the 1958 publicity campaign, admitting the text-heavy advertisement was a little on 
‘the long side’ but it was felt that ‘in view of the time element’ they should not plan: 
any attempt to use a visual in the press advertisement (which might 
otherwise be based on one of the photographs of children being vaccinated 
by a clinic doctor) and get our effect by a quoted extract from a Statement 
by the Minister set out under a striking heading, with plenty of white space 
around it, based on the wording of the Minister’s interview with 
television.59 
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The implications behind this letter were that while the more time-consuming 
addition of a visual element would achieve greater impact, (as would shorter, punchier 
copy) these shortcomings would not negate the persuasive and informative ‘effect’ of 
the advertisement if it employed a ‘striking’ title and ‘white space’. Even without the 
suggested images of children being vaccinated, (or images of children affected by polio, 
which were typical of the American vaccination campaign) the advertisement’s bold 
title was eye-catching (see figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
The opening lines stated that: ‘Polio is not yet beaten.  Next year may be one of 
Nature’s bad polio years.  Vaccination is our chief defence.’60  These words, chosen 
from a television interview with the Minister of Health, were more than informative.  
The advertisement sought to borrow authority from the Minister himself.  His words 
responded to ideas about the polio vaccine already circulating in the public sphere 
which might reduce vaccine registration, while reiterating existing ideas which might 
persuade the public to vaccinate.  There were two key elements at work here.  First, 
eradicating polio was presented as a battle with ‘Nature’, here depicted as a force given 
substance through syntax: the possessive apostrophe; the capital ‘N’; and the idea that it 
held enough agency to be ‘beaten’ imputing a power which rendered those who 
vaccinated (and those who provided the vaccine) heroic in the face of a fearsome foe.  
Secondly vaccination was presented as a ‘defence’ belonging to a public and 
government allied against polio and in pursuit of herd immunity through the use of 
‘our’, gesturing to the idea of a collective good.  Vaccination was part of the social 
rights bestowed on Britain’s publics, supposedly the hallmarks of the new welfare state 
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era.61 But it was also a duty, ‘good’ citizens must vaccinate for the sake of their own 
(and, by association, the nation’s) children, a concept established during the war with 
diphtheria immunisation.62 This heroic narrative, of a manageable present and future 
threat established, the text then moved to its second main tactic, persuasion through 
shame and blame: 
Nearly seven million children have already been vaccinated.  
What about the others? 
Parents should not hang back. 
If they do, they may have cause to reproach themselves later on. 
The vaccine – all of which is safety tested – is there. My advice is don’t 
delay. 
No longer was Nature alone culpable for polio’s scourge.  Now parents who 
‘hang back’ or ‘delay’ registration and vaccination of their children ‘may have cause to 
reproach themselves’. The pairing of risk with blame here performs a normative 
function – encouraging the avoidance of blame through the avoidance of risk.  
Simultaneously, the risk was rendered manageable and personal, shifting responsibility 
for polio infection from Nature or the health service, to parents.  This transference of 
responsibility for the unvaccinated was significant given the government’s litany of 
failures regarding supplies.  The statement ‘The vaccine – all of which is safety tested – 
is there’ dismissed circulating fears around supply issues and the relative safety and 
efficaciousness of the British and American vaccines. 
The public imagined by public health officials and constructed through this 
advertisement was one requiring instruction and reassurance, but also one open to 
persuasion.  It was a public of adult guardians assumed to have shared emotions and 
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knowledge of polio, aware of the new vaccine, willing to be moved by ideas of 
children’s vulnerability, conscious of their responsibilities towards their family’s health, 
but requiring encouragement to take the final step towards vaccination.  Children as a 
public were constructed here not as recipients of the text, but as an affective device; 
victims of parental failure to act, or mere elements in the ‘defence’ against Nature, the 
product of a successful alliance of parental and State authority.  The child who 
contracted polio, constructed by the future self ‘reproach’ of parents who failed to 
vaccinate, was thus rendered a symptom of inadequate parenting and so citizenship – 
rather than the State’s failure to provide protection.  Indeed, fear and blame, not the 
promise of citizenship, were increasingly used to persuade the public to vaccinate. 
 
Figure 3 here 
Phase 2. ‘It can leave your child crippled for life’: parents, risk and blame  
At a cursory glance, Figures 2 and 3 appear similar, however they represent a shift in 
approach from tentative encouragement (which assumed an obedient public) to a more 
robust engagement with a public in need of urgent persuasion through fear and shame.  
Beginning with the subtitle in large bold letters, the advertisement in Figure 3 delivered 
an imperative message: ‘Register your children for vaccination this week’, giving both 
an actionable instruction with a deadline and rendering the responsibility of the action 
personal through the use of ‘your’ rather than the previously favoured collective ‘our’ or 
plural ‘parents’ deployed in Figure 2.63 The desired outcome and responsibility for 
action established, the poster then proceeded to press parents through fear, shame, 
reassurance, and the provision of information.  
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The first paragraph of the advertisement (Figure 3) began with the present tense 
statement ‘Polio Paralyses’, delivered as an immutable fact in bold capitals. This 
established, it then sketched the grim future which might follow parental failure to seek 
vaccination registration: 
It can leave your child crippled for life – unable ever again to walk 
naturally. If this happened, you would never forgive yourself – when you 
could so easily have prevented it by applying for vaccination. 
Once again children’s presence within the text was reduced to an emblematic 
function, a symptom ‘for life’ of a guardian’s failure to ‘easily’ register their child 
which can ‘never’ be forgiven.  The use of em dashes to break the prose forced a pause 
for meditation upon the idea of the ‘child crippled for life’, the description made more 
vivid by the layering of additional details – ‘unable ever again to walk naturally’ – 
which conjured images of mechanical assistance.  While the words themselves are 
emotive, and told the adult audience how to feel, they also relied on the tropes and 
images of previous representations of polio and its reputation as infantile paralysis. 
The second and third paragraphs drew on tactics of information and reassurance 
to encourage guardians to register their children for vaccination, offering timely 
registration as a rational demonstration of forward planning.  While it was explained 
that immunity was not developed immediately after vaccination – a point likely stressed 
in response to the upswing in vaccination registration which followed any outbreak of 
polio despite the vaccine’s inability to provide immediate prophylaxis – reassurance 
was given; ‘your children will be protected by the Spring, when polio cases start to 
increase.’  The reassurance continues with  
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Vaccination is free, simple, almost painless and leaves no scar. All vaccine 
is stringently tested to meet [MRC] safety standards. 
The dismissal of fears around cost, pain, and scarring hark back to earlier health 
procedures, which had to be paid for before the NHS was established or, in the case of 
smallpox vaccination, free, but rather unpleasant.  The reference to ‘stringent testing’ 
acted as more than a reassurance: it attempted to dismiss lingering fears connected to 
the Cutter Incident, ongoing confusion around the efficacy and safety of the American 
versus the British vaccine, and gave an explanation for well publicised delays caused by 
the destruction of batches of vaccines found to be wanting.64  This rationalisation of 
delay was then followed by ‘There is plenty for everyone up to 25’, a reassurance 
somewhat diminished by the ‘especially for babies, toddlers and young children – and 
for all expectant mothers, too’ which followed this statement and belied the continued 
rationing of the vaccine and growing waiting lists which plagued some boroughs.  
Indeed, while childless adults under-25 might technically have been able to seek the 
vaccine through registration, they were not the public addressed or imagined by this 
poster. The final line of the poster hammers this point home ‘Act now – your child’s life 
may be at stake’.  
 
Phase 3. ‘Injections-while-you-dance!’ Vaccination as a marker of agency 
and healthy citizenship among teenagers, young adults and adult men 
Older cohorts, adolescents, and young adults living outside the family unit presented a 
new challenge to public health authorities who had far less experience advertising 
vaccination to them.  Hitherto, immunisation had been offered to children via parents or 
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specific adults placed at risk through employment.  With young adults, the target and 
the agent making the decision to seek vaccination were one and the same. Yet they had 
not typically been the recipients of vaccination and, initially at least, they were reluctant 
to present themselves, probably because they felt that they were not at risk of polio and 
did not see the reward of protection against the disease as worth the effort of registering 
for the vaccine.65 
The government responded to the needs of young adults creatively, targeting 
them where they worked and recreated both literally – by running vaccine drives and 
placing posters in these spaces – and figuratively through a new set of posters tailored to 
entice this cohort into registration [see Figure 4].  They began by reusing posters aimed 
at earlier target audiences, albeit with ‘better colour’.66  It was also suggested, however, 
that the Central Council for Health Education ‘produce another poster specially 
addressed to the 15-26 age group suitable for display in such places as technical 
colleges, youth clubs, factories, etc.’ 67 Another idea was to amend a vaccine 
registration promotion ‘tv filler’ so that it spoke directly to this older cohort.68  As with 
earlier stages, specific efforts were aimed at enticing 15-26s to register for vaccination – 
but the publicity was designed to target other cohorts too. As Heald explained in a letter 
regarding posters to local authorities with particularly low uptake: ‘one is primarily 
directed to the under-16 age group and the other the 16 to 26 age group, but each 
includes mention of the other and of expectant mothers.’69  These efforts multiplied the 
available discourses surrounding vaccination registration. While ideas of parental 
responsibility and the threat of paralysis to children still featured – with space given 
over to telling parents to register children – posters targeted at unattached under-26s 
were dominated by representations of youthful independence which created an 
association between vaccination registration and the achievement of rational agency. 
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Figure 4 here 
 
By associating vaccination spatially and figuratively with activities which 
demonstrated independence from the familial unit – work and dancing – posters 
conveyed the idea that like financial independence and the procurement of a date for a 
dance, vaccination registration was a marker of maturity and success.  The form of 
citizenship presented here depicted normative values associated with being a modern, 
young adult in the same way that it had represented ‘good parenting’ when targeting 
other cohorts.  These tactics would eventually come to garner positive media interest, 
the story no longer entirely about supply issues and failed batches, but the unusual 
efforts of health authorities to stimulate (and then meet) rising demand amongst the 
youthful population.70 
Indeed, there was an increase in uptake of polio vaccination from young people 
in 1959, but this was the result of an event out of the government’s control.  On 4 April 
1959, England international footballer Jeff Hall died of polio days after playing for 
Birmingham City.71  That a young, healthy man could die suddenly and apparently at 
random shocked people into registering for IPV.72  The Ministry co-ordinated a message 
from the Health Minister Derek Walker-Smith at all Football League matches the 
weekend following Hall’s death, and many clubs took the opportunity to vaccinate their 
squads in front of national and local media cameras.73  The resulting surge in demand 
caused significant supply problems in certain areas, but in the long run the improved 
uptake among this cohort was welcomed. 
Though Hall’s death undoubtedly led to an increase in vaccination rates, the 
innovative measures of health authorities across the country should not be overlooked.  
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Injections ‘while you dance’, declared a Manchester Guardian article on 8 April 1959, 
reporting the various efforts of health authorities around the country to reach the under-
26s.74  The article stated that: 
An ‘injections-while-you-dance’ scheme is to be operated in Bristol to 
encourage immunisation among the under 25s and, in addition to medical 
teams visiting factories, approaches are to be made to youth and dance halls 
with a view to give injections to young people. In clubs and halls dance 
records will be interrupted for propaganda announcements.75 
An approach that was already part of the ongoing polio vaccination publicity campaign 
thus became newsworthy in the face of Hall’s death. 
Phase 4 – ‘15 million people... have been given this protection already.... 
WHAT ABOUT YOU?’ Persuading the 26-40s to vaccinate 
It was ironic that, aged 29, Hall would have been too old to be part of the IPV 
programme in 1959, even if he had sought out vaccination.  This and a number of other 
factors meant that the government decided to extend the eligibility criteria to cover all 
citizens under 40 from January 1960.  The reasons for this were three-fold.  First, the 
expanded programme had been a pledge in the Conservatives’ 1959 general election 
manifesto.  Despite the supply problems and negative publicity, the programme was 
considered one of the party’s examples of a commitment to the nation’s health.  Second, 
the Ministry felt capable of delivering IPV now that the majority of under-26s likely to 
present themselves had done so, and enough children had been vaccinated so that the 
demand from this group had largely reduced to the annual birth rate. Third, the 
pharmaceutical company Pfizer had begun to produce IPV from its British plant, 
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improving the supply situation.76  However, informed audiences (and interested 
newspaper readers) knew that the oral polio vaccine being developed by Albert Sabin 
was likely to be used in the near future.77  Sensing that demand for IPV would not last 
long, Pfizer flooded the market.  Caught on the back foot, the Ministry calculated that it 
would be cheaper for the Treasury to buy the vaccine in bulk for use in the vaccination 
programme than allow Pfizer to make it available on prescription (where the NHS 
would have to pay full price for every individual injection offered). This new cohort, 
then, was created out of specific financial as well as epidemiological circumstances.  
This cohort were at lower risk of paralysis or death than younger citizens.  Still, 
disability carried significant economic risks which might destabilise the entire family 
unit; and it was these risks which were addressed by the final stage of the polio 
advertising campaign.  
The campaign to encourage the 26-40 cohort to vaccinate themselves intensified 
across 1961.  Posters played upon the ideas which previous iterations had deployed, and 
they consciously harked back to the success of earlier campaigns.  Echoing earlier 
posters in typeface, tone and through direct quotation, Figure 5 triumphantly announced 
‘15 million people – children, expectant mothers, grown-ups  – have been given this 
protection already’ before asking accusingly in bold capitals, ‘what about you?’  Here 
the narrative was not so much one of polio’s threat and parental neglect (though these 
ideas remained important and were generated by words like ‘strike’ and ‘cripple’) but 
the efficient and expected expansion of the vaccine campaign facilitated by dutiful 
citizens registering. Citizenship duties for this cohort were not only discussed by the 
government. Pfizer’s own promotional material shifted the focus away from young-
adult socialising and emphasised instead the parental duty, particularly of fathers, to 
remain healthy bread-winners and administrators of the nuclear household.78 
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Figure 5 here 
 
By overtly signalling previous campaign success alongside the question ‘what 
about you?’ the advertisement conveyed the idea that expanding vaccination to the 26-
40 age group was an inevitable sign of a successfully functioning health system, and 
that those who failed to avail themselves were reneging on the responsibilities of 
healthy citizenship which could be easily achieved.79 This subtle narrative of inevitable 
expansion of the campaign and the normalisation of vaccination registration – and so 
the deviance of failing to vaccinate – was even more explicit in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 here 
 
Appearing to be an annotated reprint of a previously circulated poster, the crossed out 
number added a hint of humour and signalled government efficiency, redrawing the 
narrative around vaccination from that of expense, inefficiency and supply issues, to a 
streamlined natural evolution of a successful health campaign.80  
While Hall’s death, election promises, and the manoeuvrings of Pfizer might 
have forced the hand of government to extend the vaccination campaign to the under 
40s in a hurry, it was generally met with media approval and ultimately marked a 
successful end to the attempts of the government to grapple with polio. The change in 
tone from threat and shame to humour and ubiquity was mirrored in press coverage.  
Gone were tales of children waiting for vaccinations the government was unable to 
provide, instead newspapers reported optimistically the expanded cohorts and coming 
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technological innovation of an oral vaccine, declaring ‘Safety on a lump of sugar’81 or 
‘under 40s will get anti-polio in three lumps’.82 
Conclusion 
The apparent success of the polio vaccination campaign should not blind us to the 
problems with its introduction and the anxieties that surrounded the disease throughout 
the 1950s and beyond. Campaign materials were confident in their presentation of polio 
vaccination as a way to combat the disease, despite the sometimes chaotic reality of the 
programme itself and the press’ representation of it as such.83  Just as the adverts and 
posters obscured the disarray that existed on an administrative level, they reveal other, 
deeper truths.  Tracing the emotive content which became a hallmark of this campaign 
and the interactions of the emotional communities which formed around this disease 
alerts us to the productive ‘work’ of emotions.  Negative emotions such as fear and guilt 
were played upon within the posters, but positive emotions were also mobilised, such as 
humour and appeals to young peoples’ burgeoning sense of their own adulthood.  
But the work of emotions in this campaign went beyond a simple persuasive 
tactic intended to increase vaccination uptake.  By identifying and building on existing 
emotional communities the Ministry of Health were also engaged in creating new 
groups; the focus on particular target populations transforming emotional communities 
into a set of overlapping publics.  These publics were imagined simultaneously as 
potential victims, vectors and vaccinators.  Unvaccinated children were presented, 
without agency, as both vectors of disease and victims of parental failure to act as 
rational citizens.  Vaccinating one’s child becoming both an act of good parenting and 
citizenship.  Vaccination was thus a right and a duty: something a parent demanded to 
protect their child, but also something that they did to ensure collective well-being 
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through the establishment of herd immunity.  These narratives around good citizenship 
highlight the ways in which socio-political rights and responsibilities are emotional, as 
well as practical and material.  Vaccination continues to be an emotive topic, but by 
assessing the role played by emotions in previous campaigns we are better placed to 
understand their function in the present. 
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